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Abstract
Third-party payer systems are consistently associated with health care cost escalation. Taiwan’s single-payer, universal
coverage National Health Insurance (NHI) adopted global budgeting (GB) to achieve cost control. This study captures
ophthalmologists’ response to GB, specifically service volume changes and service substitution between low-revenue and
high-revenue services following GB implementation, the subsequent Bureau of NHI policy response, and the policy impact.
De-identified eye clinic claims data for the years 2000, 2005, and 2007 were analyzed to study the changes in Simple Claim
Form (SCF) claims versus Special Case Claims (SCCs). The 3 study years represent the pre-GB period, post-GB but prior to
region-wise service cap implementation period, and the post-service cap period, respectively. Repeated measures multilevel
regression analysis was used to study the changes adjusting for clinic characteristics and competition within each health
care market. SCF service volume (low-revenue, fixed-price patient visits) remained constant throughout the study period,
but SCCs (covering services involving variable provider effort and resource use with flexibility for discretionary billing)
increased in 2005 with no further change in 2007. The latter is attributable to a 30% cap negotiated by the NHI Bureau with
the ophthalmology association and enforced by the association. This study demonstrates that GB deployed with ongoing
monitoring and timely policy responses that are designed in collaboration with professional stakeholders can contain costs
in a health insurance–financed health care system.
Keywords
global budgeting, game theory, provider behavior

Introduction
Background
Third-party payers have continuously innovated with payment mechanisms to overcome cost escalations resulting
from consumer moral hazard and demand induction by providers. In the United States, the initial dominance
of cost-plus reimbursement has successively given way to
per-diem reimbursement, fixed-rate diagnosis-related group
payments, capitation, and most recently, under the Affordable
Care Act, population health-driven accountable care organizations. Capitation-based reimbursement systems are complex to manage and unpopular among both providers and
patients, particularly in health systems where patients are
accustomed to free choice of providers. These issues have
led to the increasing use of global budgeting (GB), a population-based expenditure cap that accommodates a fee-forservice base in apportioning payments to providers. Germany

was among the earliest to introduce global budgets with
expenditure caps in 1992 for physician visits, and subsequently for hospital services.1 The Netherlands also has a
well-established global budget system.2
Taiwan implemented a National Health Insurance (NHI)
system in 1995, mandating universal coverage under a single-payer system. It experienced rapid escalation in health
care expenditures, which increased at an annual rate of
6.26% from 1995 to 2001 despite annual population growth
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of only 5.2% during this period.3 Premium revenues increased
by 4.26% annually, causing repeated financial crises.3 The
cost escalation under NHI is largely due to increasing use of
high-tech care (eg, 80% increase in dialysis visits between
1994 and 20003), increased intensity of care within care episodes, and increased lengths of stay.4 The cost escalation
continued even after annual rates of per capita health care
encounters stabilized following the spurt in the first NHI
year. Increases in volume and care intensity under NHI are
documented in several studies. Compared with 1994 (preNHI), the year 2000 (5 years since NHI implementation)
showed a 16.6% increase in total outpatient visits and a
19.7% increase in inpatient surgeries.3 These increases were
almost entirely accounted for by an initial spurt in utilization
by the (pre-NHI) uninsured 43% of the population.5 The preNHI insured population had annual outpatient visit rates of
12 per capita both pre-NHI and in the first year of NHI. This
is exactly the visit rate observed among the previously uninsured on becoming newly insured.5 Other studies document
the general population-wide stabilization of outpatient visit
rates following the first post-NHI year, fluctuating between
12.2 visits in 1997 and 12.7 visits in 2000.6 The slight
increase in visits is attributed to the increase in the insured
population from 92% in 1997 to 96% in 2000, and population aging.3
Unsustainable cost escalations led to sector-wise GB,
beginning with dental clinics in 1998, Chinese medicine
clinics in 2000, Western medicine clinics in 2001, and hospitals in 2002. A global budget GB is an overall spending limit
to control aggregate health care spending in a health plan,
service sector, or health care institution.7 This study was
designed to assess clinical providers’ response to GB in
terms of service volume changes and substitution of highrevenue services for low-revenue services, and later changes
in provider behavior in response to the Bureau of NHI
(BNHI) policy of imposing service caps. We used eye care
service changes to study provider behavior.
Unlike capitation that limits patient choice of providers,
GB targets providers, requiring them to either restrict care, or
accept price reductions if the collective service volume
exceeds the normative volume assumed in setting the budget.
GB is a documented cost-containment mechanism that does
not directly alienate the population, as illustrated in the
Canadian8-10 and German health care systems.11,12
In Taiwan, each sectoral global budget is allocated among
the six BNHI administrative regions. Region-wise GB allocations for the clinic sector were set in 2001 based on population, age/gender composition, standardized mortality ratio,
and historic share of health care expenditures. The initial
allocation is annually adjusted based on anticipated changes
in demographic profile.13 Each BNHI branch pays providers
quarterly, based on the monetary value of a point calculated
by pooling provider claim points in the BNHI region and
dividing the expenditure cap by the total claimed points.
Providers are reimbursed based on their individual claim
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points. A point is a standardized unit of service or care item,
used as the currency for all claims. It has a base value of
NT$1 (New Taiwan dollar) set in 2001 when the clinic sector
GB commenced. The point value is inversely proportional to
the total service volume in the region, fluctuating quarterly
with the conversion factor (CF)14 floating up or down.
Service volumes exceeding the region’s cap result in reduced
reimbursement rates per unit of service for all providers.
Specifically, provider reimbursement in NT dollars is calculated as follows: GBi = qi × ∑j (pijQij), where i is the sector,
qi is the CF for the point value for the sector, pij is the “price”
(in points) of service item j, and Qij is the quantity of service.
Because GB reimburses individually claimed points using a
fee-for-service schedule while applying an expenditure cap,
economic theory predicts that providers have an incentive to
escalate their own service volume to protect their share of the
GB pie.
Anticipating unnecessary service provision by clinics
seeking to increase their respective market shares, the BNHI
introduced concurrent policies to monitor provider volumes
and audit providers who exceed historic service volumes.14
The top 10% of providers by point volume are subjected to
administrative review by annually appointed medical teams
nominated by the regional medical societies. A random sample of claims is reviewed for care appropriateness, and questionable claims are deducted from the provider’s total claims
(points neutralized) up to a maximum of 10%. Providers who
are not in the top 10% by volume suffer a 1% to 3% neutralization of points for disproportionate increases over the previous year. This policy restrains providers with large market
shares from crowding out smaller providers through market
power. Underserved areas with health professional shortages
are exempt from this policy.
The documented effects of GB in Taiwan are increased
inpatient volumes following hospital GB,5,15 and increased
outpatient volumes following clinic sector GB.16 These studies examined total care volumes without the exploration of
care intensity or substitution of services by providers. Such
studies require specialty-specific data to identify changes in
services categorized by care intensity. The present study
examines the service provision behavior of clinic ophthalmologists under GB. In Taiwan, clinic doctors are not permitted to additionally work at hospitals and vice versa.
Physicians of eye care clinics are reimbursed either through
a Simple Claim Form (SCF) or Special Case Claim (SCC).
SCF is reimbursed with a low, fixed price for a routine bundle of services, generally a routine office visit or prescription
drugs dispensing not exceeding 3 days). An SCC is an itemized claim with potential for discretionary billing, usually
used for procedure-based care involving variable provider
effort, technology, consumables, or non-routine medicines.
Despite administrative policies to restrain unnecessary
services, physicians possess expert power advantage to
selectively over-provide high-revenue services while remaining in compliance with BNHI policies. As an administrative
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third-party payer, BNHI can do little to selectively rein in
care provision. We examine GB impacts on both volume and
composition of eye care services, fixed-price, low-revenue
SCF services versus discretionary billable SCC services. In
Taiwan, a physician can choose to be either office based or
hospital based but not both. The clinic sector was studied
because of separate GBs for the clinic and hospital sector,
and because typically most eye services are ambulatory even
when provided by a hospital.
The response to a change from fixed-rate fee-for-service
to a GB system with a variable point value is similar to a
non-zero-sum game. Game theory posits that participants
choose actions that maximize their utility considering the
choices of others. An expenditure cap should incentivize providers to restrict output to maximize the revenue from each
service. In other words, total income may be maximized at a
lower service volume if each point (CF) is worth more.
However, in a context of limited, shared resources (such as a
prospectively fixed budget with no control on individual provider volumes), individuals can increase income at the
expense of others or maintain a target income by raising their
own service volume and increasing market share even if the
per-service revenue is reduced. Each individual realizes that
the most rational choice for all other players is to increase
output, causing all players to increase their own output, even
though it will lead to a decline in the average reimbursement
rate for all players. This scenario is described as the tragedy
of the commons,17 a multi-player version of a standard game,
the prisoners’ dilemma. In the context of eye services in a GB
environment, providers faced with a choice between SCC
and SCF may be incentivized to maximize their billable
points by increasing SCC services relative to SCF. The only
penalty for increasing point volume is the neutralization of
excess points. However, from a social welfare perspective,
there may be an actual social welfare loss. The floating point
value may decline so precipitously due to greatly increased
service volumes, that the marginal cost of providing an extra
service may exceed its marginal revenue. This may result in
substandard service using inadequate or inferior resources,
thereby compromising quality. Furthermore, to the extent
that the services were unnecessary, patients are exposed to
increased risk of iatrogenic injury or adverse drug reactions,
a socially harmful outcome even though budget neutral for
the BNHI. Recognizing the potential for harm, BNHI implemented a major policy in 2005-2006, setting a 30% ceiling
on SCC points out of each clinic’s total claim.18 This study
will also investigate the impact of this payer-initiated policy
on service volume and composition.
The present study explores two research questions based
on the conceptual framework and regulatory change. The
first research question examines whether clinic sector GB,
effective 2001, was associated with a post-GB increase in
service volumes, particularly high-revenue SCC services
relative to low-revenue SCF services. At any point in time,
the total patient market (population) is fixed, and provider

time and energy are finite. Under these circumstances, GB
implementation may cause physicians to favor SCC over
SCF services in increasing their service volume. We also
examined the concomitant changes in SCF to answer the following question: Did providers (1) increase their total care
effort (SCC plus SCF), or (2) sustain their total care effort at
2000 levels but displace effort to more profitable services, or
(3) engage in unremitting care escalation of all types to maximize their market share of points? Our second research
question examines the impact of the BNHI service cap policy
on SCC and SCF volumes. Our study hypotheses were as
follows:
Hypothesis 1 (2000-2005 changes): In 2005 (post-GB),
total nationwide SCC points and average points per clinic
would be higher than in 2000 (pre-GB), and SCF points
would be lower than in 2000 (tragedy of the commons
effect).
Hypothesis 2 (2005-2007 changes): In 2007, total SCC
points would be lower than in 2005, and concurrently
SCF volumes would increase to pre-GB levels.
Our study controls for market competition in the empirical specifications used to test both hypotheses. Large urban
centers with more competitive markets may witness more
service inducement than less competitive markets in keeping
with highly competitive attitudes rather than cooperation in
highly competitive markets. Moreover, in competitive markets the potential to increase services on the extensive margin (eg, the number of different patients or office visits) is
limited whereas it is still possible to increase services on the
intensive margin (eg, the number and intensity of services
provided during each consultation). Our study also tests
whether service provision was restrained in the second period
in 2007 (post-BNHI enforcement) relative to 2005 (preBNHI enforcement), and whether the service volume change
was limited to the BNHI-targeted sector (SCC) or accompanied by compensatory increases in the unrestrained service
sector (SCF).

Materials and Methods
Since the launch of universal coverage, single-payer health
insurance system in 1995, health insurance coverage in
Taiwan increased from 56% to more than 90% the following
year, and to 99.6% for its 23 million people in 2011. Because
clinics and hospitals are required to document all care provided to claim reimbursement, the secondary claims data are
considerably reliable. In the present study, claims data on
outpatient ophthalmology clinics for the years 2000, 2005,
and 2007 were used. Clinic sector GB was implemented in
2001, and the SCC service cap policy was implemented in
2006. We used 2000 claims data representing the pre-GB
year, 2005 data representing post-GB, but prior to service
cap policy period, and 2007 the post–service cap year. The
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unit of observation is the clinic. Clinics were included in the
analysis if they were represented in the claims data in all 3
years.
Eye care falls under the umbrella of the Western medicine
clinic sector GB, and is reimbursed through SCF and SCC
mechanisms. SCF applies to most routine outpatient visits
consuming a standard amount of provider time and up to a
3-day supply of cost-predictable prescription drugs. A fixed
fee is reimbursed per SCF claim. SCC applies to non-routine
care episodes, involving variable provider time or skill, outpatient procedures involving non-standard care items or
technology or prescription drugs. SCC claims are required to
show itemized treatments, consumables, and pharmaceuticals provided. SCC claim amounts are typically higher and
more profitable than SCF, but because they have to be itemized, filing is lengthy and cumbersome.
Outpatient claims of all eye clinics were extracted from the
NHI’s de-identified claims database. Although clinics in general limit services to office visits and minor procedures, ophthalmology (unlike most specialties) is amenable to ambulatory
surgery for many eye conditions. Because of a lack of primary
care gatekeeping in Taiwan’s health system, patients can
access any clinic or hospital for care. The NHI Bureau has
defined 17 medical area networks (health care markets) based
on geographic contiguity of human settlements and commuting patterns. To calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of
market competition in each market, the total of all eye services
claims submitted by clinics and hospital outpatient departments in each medical area network served as the denominator, and each clinic’s total claims was the numerator.
Policy changes were identified by reviewing the BNHI
Web site for policies applicable to eye services and through
interviews with national and regional office-bearers of the
ophthalmologists’ association. These officers engage with
the BNHI in policy development and enforcement.

Statistical Analyses
Changes in point volumes were analyzed separately for SCF
and SCC. The following were used: (1) t test of differences
in mean claim points per clinic nationwide, and clinic-level
paired t tests of differences in claimed points between 2000,
2005, and 2007; (2) paired t tests of differences in clinic
points within each health care market in the above-mentioned
3 years; and (3) multilevel modeling with repeated measures
to model SCF and SCC separately, specifying health care
market fixed effects. Market fixed effect was used to account
for health care market characteristics that may affect a provider behavior.
All clinics with eye care claims in 2000, 2005, and 2007
were included in the study. Annual SCF and SCC points were
calculated for each clinic. SCC and SCF claim points were the
key dependent variables of interest. Key predictor variables
were market competition level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), clinic type (solo practice, single-specialty group
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Table 1. Distribution of Clinics With SCF Claims and SCCs in 2000.

Clinic characteristics
Clinic type
Solo practice
Single-specialty group
Multi-specialty group
Ownership
Public and non-profit
For-profit
Total

SCF

SCC

N (%)

N (%)

229 (77.1)
52 (17.5)
16 (5.4)

327 (78.2)
67 (16.0)
24 (5.7)

9 (3.0)
288 (97.0)
297 (100.0)

11 (2.6)
407 (97.4)
418 (100.0)

Note. SCF = Simple Claim Form; SCC = Special Case Claim.

practice, and multi-specialty group practice), and geographic
region (north, south, central, and east). Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) was calculated as the sum of squared market
shares of the clinics out of the total outpatient eye care provided in clinics and hospitals in each health care market. A
higher HHI score indicates lower competition or high market
concentration, and a lower HHI indicates a highly competitive
market.
SAS (Version 9.2) was used. Measures of skewness and
linear regression residual analysis showed violations of normality of the dependent variables, SCF and SCC. Natural log
and square-root transformations were tested; the latter
resulted in a near-normal distribution, suitable for linear
regression. Square-root transformations of claim points were
subjected to multiple regression analyses that produced randomly distributed residuals across clinics by size or type
(without heteroscedasticity) permitting valid inferences.

Results
Table 1 presents the distribution of clinics by type and ownership. Approximately 80% of clinics were solo practices,
mostly for-profit. A total of 418 clinics had SCC claims in all
3 study years, and 297 clinics had SCF claims in all 3 years.
Figure 1 and Table 2 show that the nationwide mean SCC
claim point per clinic in 2005 was higher than in 2000 (paired
t test, P < .0001). The 2007 claim volume was similar to that
of 2005 (P = .40). The SCC increase in 2005 was driven by
significant increases in the highly competitive markers of the
major metropolitan cities (Taipei, Taichung, Kaohsiung,
Taoyuan, and Changhwa, points A-E in Figure 2). The
increase in SCC points followed by stabilization in 2007 at
the 2005 level is validated by clinic-level paired t tests within
markets, with the highest increases observed in the abovementioned five markets (table not shown).
For SCF, Figure 3 shows that the nationwide claims total
in 2005 was similar to 2000 and 2007 (health care marketwise paired t tests, P = .31, and P = .56, respectively; see
Table 2). The lack of significant difference nationally was
sustained in within-market analyses (table not shown). Plots
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Figure 1. Mean Special Case Claim points per eye clinic in Taiwan.
Table 2. Paired t Tests of the Differences in Global Budget Points Claimed by Clinics, Pre-GB, Post-GB but Prior to Service Cap, and
Post–Service Cap.
Paired t test
Difference between years (later minus earlier)
SCF
SCC

2000 vs. 2005
2005 vs. 2007
2000 vs. 2005
2005 vs. 2007

Mean difference

P value

133 107
−47 550
724 952
63 761

.312
.560
<.0001
.397

Note. GB = global budgeting; SCF = Simple Claim Form; SCC = Special Case Claim.

of clinic means grouped by market against HHI show no systematic patterns relative to the intensity of competition (see
Figure 4). The observed year-wise changes in the figure are
not statistically significant.
Multiple regression analysis results are shown in Table 3.
The adjusted SCC points were significantly different by
study year, with 2005 points being higher than 2000 points
(P < .0001). SCC point volume in 2007 was similar to the
2005 volume. Multi-specialty group practices claimed significantly more points than solo and single-specialty group
practices (P < .01, and P < .001, respectively). The SCC
point volume was not associated with market competition
(P = .06). Interactions between year and competition, year
and ownership, and competition and ownership were not significant. Health care market effect was not significant but was
retained in both SCF and SCC regression models to account
for unique market characteristics driving provider behavior.
For SCF, the 2005 and 2007 volumes were similar to 2000
after accounting for clinic type and ownership. Multi-specialty

group practices claimed significantly more points than solo
and single-specialty groups. In addition, for-profit status was
associated with higher SCF points (both P < .001). Market
competition was significant, and lower competition was associated with higher SCF points. None of the interaction terms
was significant.
To facilitate conclusions on provider behavior across the
two service types, Table 4 presents an integrative summary
of findings and the associated conclusions regarding provider behavior. Low-revenue, fixed-rate SCF services
remained constant from pre-GB to early post-GB and late
post-GB, but SCC increased in 2005 over pre-GB, and was
sustained at the 2005 level in 2007.

Discussion
Our study documents evidence of increased provision of discretionary billable, care-intensive services with no change in
low-revenue services under GB. These findings support that
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Figure 2. Mean SCC points per clinic in each medical care market represented by the HHI level.
Note. SCC = Special Case Claim.

Simplified Claim Form
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Figure 3. Mean Simple Claim Form points per clinic—All clinics in Taiwan.

providers attempt to maximize their individual share of the
global budget to maintain a target level of income. The BNHI
responded by co-opting the experts (specialist associations)
to come up with a realistic cap on discretionary billable services using historic data, and enlisted physician cooperation
for the policy by relying on professional self-regulation to
enforce the caps. Concurrently, the BNHI promoted awareness of the collective long-term interest of providers served
by limiting health care costs to NHI premium revenues. The
strategy was effective, as shown by sustained SCC volumes
in 2007 at the 2005 level with no further increase.
Viewing SCF and SCC changes concurrently, we observe
that a constant level of SCF throughout the study period was

observed, concurrent with an increase in SCC during the
unregulated post-GB period until 2005. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that providers seek to maintain a target
level of income, and, in the context of global budgets, respond
by increasing discretionary billable SCC procedures to maximize their individual share of the region’s budget. Moreover, in
2007, providers limited SCC volumes to the 2005 level, consistent with the goals of the policy-enforced caps.
One could question why SCF volumes remained at preGB levels in the post-GB years despite the incentive to provide more services. Unlike industrial production, capacity for
producing medical services is limited by the specialist’s fixed
time resource. The observed increase in SCC with no changes
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Figure 4. Mean SCF points per clinic in each medical care market represented by the HHI level.

Note. M represents Hualien that had no SCF cases claimed; therefore, it does not appear. SCF = Simple Claim Form.

in SCF is consistent with providers using available additional
time (and patients) to produce higher revenue yielding services. Subsequently, the stagnation of SCC service volumes
in 2007 without concurrent increases in SCF may attest to
near saturation of providers’ time resource, and the poor
incentive to invest extra effort in more SCF services given its
low reimbursement rate. Consistent with our conceptual
framework, SCC volume increases were particularly high in
highly competitive markets. Another important finding consistent with a conclusion of incentive-driven provider behavior is that for-profit entities show higher volumes relative to
public and non-profit clinics. This is especially notable with
SCF claims. In addition, confounding between clinic type and
ownership may be allowing clinic type to capture some of the
ownership effect in respect of SCC claims. Higher SCF claim
volume by for-profit clinics suggests some unnecessary services provided, reflecting possible social welfare loss, as well
as the limitations of public policy in improving market efficiency beyond a point.
One potential confounding factor could be changing
demographic composition over time, particularly population
aging, and differential changes across markets. Mitigating
this concern is the policy of the NHI Bureau, to allocate the
national global budget cap among the six NHI administrative
regions by adjusting for regional demographic composition,
using a complex, historic utilization-based algorithm.13 Thus,
all clinics within a region face the same cap and the same
demographic distribution, the demand-side variable. We
used the HHI index of market competition to adjust for the
role of supply-demand dynamics within a market. Data on
demographic distributions within each HHI region are not
available, and HHI regions are not contiguous with the NHI

Table 3. Adjusted Associations Between Eye Care Volume and
GB Policies, Year 2000 (Pre-GB), 2005 (Post-GB but Pre–SCC
Service Cap), and 2007 (Post–SCC Service Cap).

Intercept
Year
2005
2000
2007
Clinic type
Solo
Single-specialty group
Multi-specialty group
Ownership
Public or non-profit
For-profit
HHI

SCC

SCF

1099.4***

546.63**

Reference
−204.80***
21.30

Reference
−19.60
−18.30

Reference
240.02**
505.91***

Reference
86.89
578.11***

Reference
45.82
0.06

Reference
1547.1***
0.18***

Note. Geographic region is collinear with the HHI area and hence
removed from the model. GB = global budgeting; SCC = Special Case
Claim; SCF = Simple Claim Form.
* P < .05. **P < .01. ***P < .001.

administrative regions. Inability to adjust for demographic
composition is a study limitation. However, a review of the
overall population change in Taiwan during the study period
reveals patterns that support our conclusions.
The appendix table shows the age-sex distribution of
Taiwan’s population in the 3 study years. The population
aged above 50 years has the highest risk of eye disease and
degenerative conditions, accounting for the most demand for
eye care services worldwide.19,20 This age group increased
from 20.7% of the 2000 population to 24.9% of a slightly
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Table 4. Summary of Eye Care Provider Behavior Under Global Budgets.
Change in 2005 over 2000
SCF
SCC
Conclusion

Overall conclusion

Change in 2007 over 2005

No change
Increased
• SCC shows tragedy of the commons effect. But SCF did not
show a concurrent decrease. Therefore, overall volume of
services increased

No change
No change
• SCC shows no change from 2005 to 2007 due
to the implementation of NHI regulation and
associated penalties for oversupply of SCC
services
• Overall therefore, provider behavior is consistent with the
• SCF that is not regulated by NHI remained
tragedy of the commons effect of GB
constant in 2007 relative to 2005 (and 2000),
indicating that the increase in services observed
in 2005 over 2000 remains sustained in 2007
Despite SCF volume remaining constant throughout, the overall data support a tragedy of the commons effect
of GB, attributable to providers selectively increasing higher revenue yielding SCC services until 2005 and then
keeping the SCC service volume constant following policy intervention. Providers did not alter their SCF volume as
the points generated by SCF visits are low and fixed

Note. SCF = Simple Claim Form; SCC = Special Case Claim; GB = global budgeting.

larger 2005 population, and 26.7% of the 2007 population.
This represents a 20% increase between the pre-GB and
post-GB, pre–SCC cap periods, and further by 7.3% between
the pre–SCC cap and the post–SCC cap years. These
increases were accompanied by a 2.5% increase in 2005 SCF
claims over the 2000 level (133 107 mean points increase in
2005 over the 2000 mean clinic points of ~5 360 000, see
Table 2 and Figure 3) and a 37.1% increase in SCC claims
(724 952 increase over the 2000 mean clinic total of
1 950 000 points, see Table 2 and Figure 1). The observed
changes in service volumes relative to at-risk population volumes reflect that clinics disproportionately increased the
high-revenue SCC services relative to the increase in at-risk
population. Concurrently, there was a disproportionately low
(statistically negligible) change in SCF claims. These findings support our conclusions.
In summary, provider behavior is found to be consistent
with the predictions of the tragedy of the commons theory
under global budget constraints concurrent with a fee-forservice reimbursement system. First, SCC volume increased
while SCF volume remained constant from 2000 to 2005.
Then, following the imposition of volume controls on SCC
as a percentage of a clinic’s total claimed points in 2005 and
2006, the growth in SCC service volumes stopped between
2005 and 2007.
Our findings suggest that in global budget environments,
payers should monitor all the relevant service categories with
potential for substitution. For example, a study in Germany
showed that the apparent savings from implementing a pharmaceutical sector GB were actually transferred to other service
areas (patient referral to specialists or hospitals that had no such
caps), resulting in higher total costs to the health system.21
The current study also shows that combating service distortions resulting from perverse economic incentives under

global budgets remains a difficult challenge for insurance
administrators. To expect physicians to self-regulate and
constrain services to the level of the population’s need is
unrealistic when economic incentives promote a game-
theoretic tragedy of the commons outcome. Future studies
should address whether payers can permit the floating point
value to fall as service volume rises without endangering the
population’s health status. To meet these diverse goals, payers need to regulate specific types of service in partnership
with medical experts and professional associations.
The findings of the present study are consistent with the
experimental results of an earlier study. The impact of expenditure caps and expenditure targets on hypothetical service
volumes were tested in a college classroom game.22 Under
both mechanisms, the objective was to keep the total expenditure equal to the total premiums collected during the current
year. In the expenditure target experiment, each student (hypothetically a physician) was assigned to perform at fixed fee
rates a fixed quota of services. If their actual services deviated
from the quota, their individual fees were proportionately
adjusted. Under the alternative mechanism of the expenditure
cap, a total monetary budget was established across all players
for a given period, without individual quotas. Each player was
reimbursed at a common unit price determined by the total
budget divided by the aggregate points accumulated by all
players. Students responded to the collective expenditure cap
(similar to Taiwan’s GB) with higher service volumes than
under an expenditure target. Thus, players maximized income
under an individual expenditure target by controlling service
production. However, under a collective expenditure cap, each
player has no control over other players’ response, and they
respond by maximizing market share by over-providing services, even if doing so reduces the marginal income for each
item of service provided.
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Conclusions
Our study extends the findings of earlier studies from Taiwan
that showed increases in overall service volumes with GB
(increased inpatient volumes following hospital GB,5,15 and
increased outpatient volumes following clinic sector GB16). We
explored service volume and composition changes within a
single specialty, and found evidence of displacement of provider efforts to more profitable services. Furthermore, our study
finds that co-option of professional associations is effective for
regulating medical services. The study does not, however,
establish whether the observed increases are welfare enhancing
(increasing patient utility) or socially harmful (iatrogenic harm
from unnecessary services). Future studies should focus on the
health outcome impact of Taiwan’s global budgets.
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